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A B S T R A C T
The use of geoforensic analysis in criminal investigations is continuing to develop, with the
diversiﬁcation of analytical techniques, many of which are semi-automated, facilitating prompt analysis
of large sample sets at a relatively low cost. Whilst micro-scale geoforensic analysis has been shown to
assist criminal investigations including homicide (Concheri et al., 2011 [1]), wildlife crime (Morgan et al.,
2006 [2]), illicit drug distribution (Stanley, 1992 [3]), and burglary (Mildenhall, 2006 [4]), its application
to the pressing international security threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) is yet to be
considered. This experimental study simulated an IED supply chain from the sourcing of raw materials
through to device emplacement. Mineralogy, quartz grain surface texture analysis (QGSTA) and particle
size analysis (PSA) were used to assess whether environmental materials were transferred and
subsequently persisted on the different components of three pressure plate IEDs. The research also
addressed whether these samples were comprised of material from single or multiple geographical
provenances that represented supply chain activity nodes. The simulation demonstrated that material
derived from multiple activity nodes, was transferred and persisted on device components. The results
from the mineralogy and QGSTA illustrated the value these techniques offer for the analysis of mixed
provenance samples. The results from the PSA, which produces a bulk signature of the sample, failed to
distinguish multiple provenances. The study also considered how the environmental material recovered
could be used to generate information regarding the geographical locations the device had been in
contact with, in an intelligence style investigation, and demonstrated that geoforensic analysis has the
potential to be of value to international counter-IED efforts. It is a tool that may be used to prevent the
distribution of large quantities of devices, by aiding the identiﬁcation of the geographical location of key
activity nodes.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
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journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate / forsc i int1. Introduction
Geoforensic analysis is the application of techniques and
principles derived from the geoscience disciplines to criminal
investigations, for both intelligence and prosecution purposes [1–
6]. Today, geoforensic analysis is rapidly evolving, with advances
made in analytical equipment, facilitating a diversiﬁcation in
techniques, such that analysis is no longer limited to approx-
imations of colour, grain-size and mineralogy [7,8]. Many
techniques are now semi-automated, enabling rapid analysis of
large sample sets. Advancements in equipment have facilitated* Corresponding author at: UCL Centre for the Forensic Sciences, University
College London, 35 Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9EZ, United Kingdom.
E-mail address: ruth.morgan@ucl.ac.uk (R.M. Morgan).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2017.06.028
0379-0738/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open acceimproved limits of detection, whilst the development of analytical
approaches including Quantitative Evaluation of Minerals by
Scanning Electron Microscopy (QEMSCAN) and laser ablation,
have enabled sub-particle scale analysis.
1.1. Geoforensic analysis
It has been acknowledged that within the forensic sciences the
importance of understanding evidence within a probabilistic
framework that relies on an exclusionary approach is critical for
effective analysis and interpretation of samples, and subsequent
presentation of evidence and/or intelligence [9]. This is in clear
contrast to the approach typically adopted within the traditional
environmental sciences [10–12]. The adoption of an exclusionary
approach (in contrast to association or matching), reduces thess article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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samples, which may result in inaccurate interpretations [9].
Experimental studies have begun to consider the effects of pre-,
syn- and post-forensic event material transfer, that creates the
potential for mixing of environmental and anthropogenic materi-
als derived from different provenances on a single exhibit [8,13–
15]. Arguably there is potential for all exhibits in a forensic
investigation such as vehicles, footwear, clothing, to preserve
mixed source samples. Multiple source transfer adds a level of
complexity to an investigation, as failure to distinguish multiple
sources may result in the false exclusion of a sample or area of
interest. However in harnessing the potential of such occurrences,
there exists the opportunity to recreate the geographical journey of
an object and/or person. The key to achieving this type of
reconstruction is establishing the evidence dynamics of relevant
trace materials on the object/person in question, and the
utilization of appropriate analytical techniques, which enable
individual provenances to be distinguished from one another.
There is therefore, a need for simulation studies which investigate
pre-, syn- and post forensic event material transfer and persistence
in order to develop an evidence based interpretation approach that
considers the presence of mixed provenance signals. Where the
existence of such mixed provenance samples is possible, it has
been argued that there is beneﬁt in utilsing analytical approaches
that do not homogenise the sample prior to analysis, such as
mineralogy by binocular microscopy [16]. It is also necessary to
employ independent forms of analysis, so that if there are
corroborative ﬁndings on a series of samples, the signiﬁcance of
a ﬁnding can be articulated clearly whether as evidence for a court
of law, or as intelligence for investigators [9,16].
1.2. Security challenge: IED distribution
IEDs pose a considerable security threat on an international
scale, in both zones of conﬂict and peace. Such devices have long
been the weapon of choice for a continuum of individuals andTable 1
The supply chain simulated within this study. Details of the underlying bedrock geology
[31].
Stage Supply chain activity nodes Land-use 
1 Raw materials purchased Urban/city environment. Shops/supp
purchase raw materials: Asda, Maplin
2 Raw materials transported to storage
facility via train and car
Train carriage and car boot 
3 Raw materials stored Housing estate/urban environment. 
used in the construction of the three
on the ground in an outside storage a
a disused brick barbeque and tarpau
4 Raw materials transported from the
raw material storage facility to the
build site in the boot of a car
Car boot 
5 3 mock devices constructed
(constructed on 2 different days,
devices 1 on day 1 and devices 2 and
3 on day 2)
Equine pastureland/ﬁeld 
6 Complete mock devices transported to
IED cache on foot
Transported across car park on foot
7 Complete mock IEDs stored
approximately 35 m from the
construction location
Industrial barn/equine riding arena 
8 Complete mock devices transported to
IED emplacement location in the boot
of a car
Car boot 
9 Emplacement of mock devices Mock
devices covered with vegetation and
leaf litter for concealment purposes
Un-landscaped garden bordering smgroups including terrorists and organised crime groups, in an
endeavour to cause harm to people, physical infrastructure,
political relations, and economies, as well as a method of
protecting goods caches. Improvisation facilitates construction
of devices from everyday (non illicit or contraband) items, which
are easily purchased and distributed internationally [17], owing to
the absence of government exporting licences [18]. The nature of
these materials also limits the ability to attribute their source.
Moreover, they can be manufactured relatively cheaply, whilst still
possessing the potential to produce signiﬁcant negative impacts
[19]. IEDs are expected to be the weapon of choice for the
foreseeable future [20,21], with the developing threat of Chemical
Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) IEDs [22,23], and
advancements in technology facilitating new methods of device
deployment, such as IEDs attached to drones [24].
IEDs are distributed along supply chains consisting of key
activities, including raw material sourcing, and device construc-
tion, storage and emplacement [25]. These key activities occur at
one or more geographical locations/sites (including indoor and
outdoor locations), such that there is potential for multiple sources
of material to be transferred onto devices [26]. The supply chain is
facilitated by a network of individuals including but not limited to,
ﬁnanciers, legitimate raw materials businesses, material/equip-
ment procurers, technical experts, device manufacturers, and
those responsible for emplacing devices [27].
Counter-IED (C-IED) is concerned with developing methods to
reduce and eradicate the IED threat on an international scale.
Techniques, approaches and technologies which make up C-IED are
in part informed by device exploitation. Device exploitation refers
to the process of obtaining and examining information recovered
from IEDs, such as biometric data [28], to derive intelligence to
assist the three lines of operation; defeat the device, prepare the
force and attack the network [29]. Currently, the use of
environmental materials adhering to devices, to derive intelligence
as to the geographical location of activity nodes in IED supply
chains, has yet to be explored. and land-use are given. Contains British Geological Survey materials© NERC [2017]
Underlying bedrock geology & superﬁcial deposits
liers used to
, Amazon, Homebase
Not applicable – raw materials in sealed packaging
Not applicable
The raw materials
 devices were stored
rea, which comprised
lin roof
Bedrock geology: Close/on the boundary between the
Harwich Formation and the London clay Formation
Superﬁcial deposits: Kempton Park Gravel Formation
Not applicable
Bedrock geology: Seaford Chalk Formation and Newhaven
Chalk Formation Superﬁcial deposits: Head deposits and
the Lynch Hill Gravel Member
 Not applicable
Same site as build site, however in an indoor equestrian
riding arena, comprising un-consolidated sands and
multi-coloured ﬁbrous bundles, set upon a concrete
foundation
Not applicable
all wooded area Bedrock geology: Close to/on the boundary between the
Lewes Nodular Chalk Formation, and the Seaford Chalk
and Newhaven Chalk Formations Superﬁcial deposits:
Clay-with-ﬂints Formation
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mental materials i.e. soils and sediments (including anthropogenic
additions), were transferred and persisted on device components,
from multiple locations i.e. activity nodes, of a simulated IED
supply chain. Preferential transfer and decay was considered and
contextual information regarding the amount of material recover-
able, and the effects of sampling from different components of an
IED, established. The study also sought to consider how the
information generated by analysing recovered environmental
samples could be used to reconstruct the geographical locations
where the device had been, in a seek and ﬁnd investigation, where
no control sample is available.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Supply chain simulation
An IED supply chain was simulated starting from the
sourcing of raw materials through to device emplacement,
after which mock devices were recovered for exploitation
(Table 1). The IED perpetration core model [25] was used in
combination with extensive consultation with security profes-
sionals from the National Bomb Data Centre & Explosive
Ordnance Disposal to develop a simulation of an IED supply
chain comprising outdoor and indoor locations (see Table 1)
that modelled reality as closely as possible. Owing to the
improvised nature of IEDs, those classiﬁed as the same type of
device, can be very different in dimensions and form, such that
modelling device type would not generate a generalisableFig. 1. Map detailing the locations of activity nodes within the simulated IED supply ch
same location, but on different parts of the site.evidence base for interpretation. For this reason, the study
focused on incorporating some of the most commonly used
materials i.e. wood, metal, plastic and tape into a wooden
pressure plate, victim operated IED, one of the most commonly
used devices in the 2001–2014 Afghanistan conﬂict [30]. In
order to assess result consistency, the production and distribu-
tion of three identical mock devices was modelled from raw
material sourcing to emplacement.
As the study sought to assess primarily whether environ-
mental and anthropogenic materials from multiple activity
nodes of a simulated IED supply chain were transferred and
subsequently persisted on device components, locations with
different bedrock materials were selected, as this is recognised
as a factor which in part controls the mineralogical composition
of top soil/sediment deposits [32]. The different types of land-
use included within the supply chain simulation, endeavours to
reﬂect the types of environments identiﬁed in case work
examples. Control samples were collected at the supply chain
activity nodes for exclusion purposes, however it was not
possible to collect control samples from the material source
locations as they were retail outlets. An overview map of the
locations is provided in Fig. 1.
2.2. Sample preparation
Material was sampled from 8 different areas on the three mock
devices as shown in Fig. 2, to assess whether the materials
preserved were consistent not only between devices, but between
different areas of individual devices. Samples were weighedain. Source location of Amazon plastic containers unknown. Build site and cache at
Fig. 2. Sampling locations on all 3 mock devices.
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establish the amount of material recoverable. The material
recovered was then compared against control samples taken from
the activity nodes. Scanning Electron Microscopy [33–35],
binocular microscopy [36–38] and particle size analysis [39–41]
were selected as frequently utilised analytical approaches for trace
environmental samples in forensic enquiry.
A Low powered Leica S6E L2 binocular microscope was used to
identify mineralogy and other materials both in the control
samples, and samples recovered from device components. Samples
were placed in a petri dish and examined at varying magniﬁcations
between 0.63 and 4.0.
Quartz grains recovered from device components were
analysed using a Cambridge Stereoscan 90 Scanning Electron
Microscope (SEM). From each sample, 50 quartz grains were
sampled and mounted on SEM stubs using an adhesive carbon ﬁlm.
Quartz grains were categorised following the method outlined in
Bull and Morgan [34].
A Malvern laser granulometer (a Hydro 2000 MU dispersion
unit coupled to Mastersizer 2000 laser), which measures particles
from 0.02 mm up to 2000 mm, was used to establish the particle
size of control samples, and those removed from the three devices.
Samples were washed in de-ionized water to remove organic
debris, and then mixed using the dispersion unit, to prevent
vertical density layering and facilitate separation of remaining
aggregates. The sample was automatically measured three times
on a single run to assess reproducibility. Gradistat [42] was used to
generate particle size descriptions and histograms were produced
using excel.Table 2
Amount of material (g) recovered from the eight different sampling locations on the
three complete mock devices.
Sample location Device 1 Device 2 Device 3
Batteries 0.3044 0.1366 0.0699
Battery pack 0.7326 0.0874 0.0857
Bare copper wire None 0.1133 0.1029
Electrical tape Trace Trace Trace
Outside of container 0.2476 0.2694 0.4564
Inside of container Variable Variable Variable
Wood (side panels) 0.0717 0.181 0.2759
Wood (top plate) 3.6231 2.7541 2.67473. Results
3.1. Recoverable sample weights
There was variability in the preservation of material on/in the
mock IEDs derived from one or more activity nodes of the
simulated IED supply chain (Table 2). For all three mock devices,
the largest amount of material persisted on the wood (top plate),
whilst the smallest amount of material recovered varied between
the three mock devices. The only sampling location that appeared
to preserve no material was the bare Cu wire of mock device 1. It
was not possible to weigh the material preserved on the electrical
tape, as it could not be effectively recovered from the adhesive,
without potentially crushing/modifying certain grains in the
sample. Moreover, it was not possible to recover all of the material
preserved on the device components, as some of the material was
inaccessible (for example, lodged in the lattice of the wood), such
that the total weight represents the material that was recoverable
rather than the total amount preserved. In total, the greatest
amount of material was recovered from mock device 1. At the IED
build site, stones were purposefully added to the inside of the
container, as they are commonly used in IEDs to increase
fragmentation during a blast. For this reason, the weight of the
material recovered from the inside of container is listed as
‘variable’ in Table 2, as it is dependent on the amount added by the
device manufacturer.
3.2. Mineralogy
3.2.1. Control samples
Low powered binocular microscopy revealed that all control
samples, with the exception of the car boot, contained quartz
(clear, milk and citrine), with some grains demonstrating black
mineral inclusions as Table 3 denotes. In addition, control samples
from the raw material storage facility (RMSF) contained individual
particles of mica, charcoal, paint ﬂakes, organic debris and
aggregates of quartz (both with and without inclusions) mica,
charcoal and organic debris termed A2. Individual grains of calcite,
stones/clasts (chalk, ﬂint and tarmac), animal hair and aggregates
of quartz (both with and without inclusions), calcite, tarmac and
organic debris termed A1, were identiﬁed exclusively in the build
site control samples. In the control samples taken from the IED
cache, prasiolite and multi-coloured ﬁbres (individual and bundle
Table 3
Minerals and other materials present in the 4 control samples, and samples recovered from components of the 3 complete mock devices. No material recovered (N).
Device number/location Sample name Quartz (clear/citrine/
milk)
Prasiolite Mica Calcite A1: Aggregate of quartz, calcite, tarmac and organic
debris
A2: Aggregate containing quartz, mica, charcoal and organic
debris
Clasts (chalk, ﬂint,
tarmac)
Raw material storage facility Control sample U x U x x U x
Car boot Control sample x x x x x x x
Build site Control sample U x x U U x U
IED cache Control sample U U x x x x x
Emplacement Control sample U x x x x x x
Spare components sampled
prior to transport to the build
site
Wood (side
panels)
U x U x x U x
Wood (top plate) U x U x x U x
Plastic coated
wire
U x x x x U x
Batteries U x U x x U x
Battery pack U x U x x U x
Spare components sampled
following
construction at the build site
Wood (side
panels)
U x x U U x x
Wood (top plate) U x x U U x x
Plastic coated
wire
U x x x U x x
Batteries U x x U U x x
Battery pack U x x U U x x
Device number/location Sample name Tarmac Charcoal Brick Organic material Plant material Multi-coloured ﬁbres Paint ﬂake Animal hair Insect shell Black ﬁbres Transparent
spheres
Raw material storage facility Control sample x U U U U x U x U x x
Car boot Control sample x x x x x x x x x U x
Build site Control sample U x U U U x x U U x U
IED cache Control sample U x x x x U x x x x U
Emplacement Control sample x x U U U x x x U x x
Spare components sampled
prior to transport to the build site
Wood (side panels) x U x U x x x x x x x
Wood (top plate) x U U U U x x x U x x
Plastic coated wire x U x U x x x x x x x
Batteries x U x U x x x x x x x
Battery pack x U U U U x x x U x x
Spare components sampled following
construction at the build site
Wood (side panels) U x x U U x x x x x x
Wood (top plate) U x x U U x x x x x x
Plastic coated wire U x x U U x x x x x x
Batteries U x x U U x x x x x x
Battery pack U x x U U x x U x x U
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control samples taken from both the build site and cache. Such
spheres are typically observed in road paint [43], and/or represent
ﬂy ash particles [44]. The emplacement location possessed no
identiﬁable material exclusive to that site. The only materials
recoverable from the boot of the car were black ﬁbres.
3.2.2. Device samples
The environmental materials recovered from different device
components are presented in Table 3, in order to provide an
assessment of the variability between the three mock devices that
were constructed in the same manner. The occurrence of
individual grains of quartz (clear, milk and citrine) both with
and without inclusions, calcite, tarmac, organic material and A1,
were universal across all three mock devices (Table 3), for all eight
sampling points, with the exception of the bare copper wire of
mock device 1, where no material was recovered. The battery pack
of mock device 1 was the only component to contain A2, consistent
with the raw material storage facility (RMSF) control sample.
Material from the inside of the containers of all three mock
devices, the batteries of mock device 1, and the tape of mock device
2 were the only samples not to display ﬁbres identiﬁed in the IED
cache control sample (Table 3). The inside of the containers were
the only sample locations which comprised stones/clasts of chalk,
tarmac and ﬂint, consistent with control samples taken from the
IED build site. White and brown animal hair, likewise only in
control samples taken from the IED build site, were recovered from
the inside of the container of all three mock devices, as well as from
the bare copper wire of mock device 3 and the electrical tape of
mock device 1.
3.2.3. Spare components
Table 4 presents the environmental materials recovered from
spare components before transport to the IED build site, and
following mock device construction. Most notably is the presence
of A2, and individual grains of charcoal on all spare components
analysed prior to movement to the IED build site, and their absence
on other spare components following device construction.
Individual mica grains were observable on all spare components
with the exception of the plastic coated wire before movement to
the IED build site. After the construction of the mock devices, no
mica grains were identiﬁable on any of the spare components.
3.3. SEM
3.3.1. Control samples
In total, 6 different grain types were classiﬁed during QGSTA,
descriptions of these grain types are provided in Table 5. All four
control samples contained type 1 and type 2A quartz grains
(Table 6). Both the IED build site and the emplacement location
control samples comprised type 3A quartz grains. Types 2B and 3B
were identiﬁed exclusively in the IED build site control sample,
whilst grain type 4 was only identiﬁed in the IED cache control
sample. Many of the quartz grains at both the IED build site and the
IED cache, regardless of type, displayed complete grain breakage.
3.3.2. Device samples
Types 1 and 2A quartz grains were recovered from all
components of the three mock devices, with the exception of
the bare copper wire of mock device 1, where no material was
recovered (Table 7). The inside of the container of mock device
1 and the tape of mock device 3 were the only components which
displayed type 3B quartz grains. As with the control samples, many
of the quartz grains, regardless of type, displayed complete grain
breakage.3.4. Particle size analysis (PSA)
3.4.1. Control samples
Observation of particle size distribution curves and data
revealed differences between the four control samples (Fig. 3).
Descriptive data generated using GRADISTAT [42], identiﬁed the
raw material storage facility and the emplacement location as
displaying bi-modal distributions, with the former however being
very poorly sorted, whilst the latter was poorly sorted. Both the IED
build site and the IED cache displayed a uni-modal distribution,
however the former was considered very poorly sorted and the
latter moderately well sorted. The IED cache demonstrated the
narrowest particle size range between 16 mm–710 mm, whilst the
emplacement location displayed a range between 2 mm–1100 mm.
Both the raw material storage facility and the IED construction site
possessed the largest particle size ranges between 1 mm–
2000 mm.
3.4.2. Device samples
Particle size data was largely variable for the same component
across the three mock devices (Fig. 4). Despite much variability, a
number of samples demonstrated particle size distribution
patterns which could not be discriminated from one another,
including the top wooden panel of mock devices 1 and 3, however
such consistency was limited. Interestingly, particle size distribu-
tion histograms of material recovered from the inside of containers
revealed that mock devices 2 and 3, displayed a similar pattern of
variation, different to that of the inside of the container of mock
device 1. Particle size distribution curves produced for material
recovered from mock device components could largely be
discriminated from all 4 control samples.
4. Discussion
Mineralogy and QGSTA results were relatively consistent for
individual device components across the mock three devices
(Tables 3 and 7). However, particle size distribution data of
recovered materials, was far more variable for the same
components, across the three devices (Fig. 4).
4.1. Comparative investigative approach
A comparative style approach was used to assess whether
environmental materials were transferred and preserved from
multiple activity nodes of the simulated IED supply chain. All three
independent techniques deployed indicated that the samples
recovered from different components of the three devices,
recorded a mixed provenance signal. This indicates that material
was transferred and preserved from two or more nodes of the IED
supply chain, and not just the last activity node visited, i.e. the
emplacement location. Where possible, binocular microscopy and
SEM results were used to exclude supply chain sites from which
recovered environmental materials analysed, were not transferred
and/or preserved, while PSA results were used only as descriptors.
Observation of the mineralogical constituents recovered from
the three complete devices demonstrated that the battery pack of
mock device 1 was the only component to preserve A2, which were
only identiﬁed in the RMSF control sample. Therefore, with the
exception of the battery pack of mock device 1, the mineralogical
constituents recovered from the components of the three complete
mock devices, exclude the RMSF as an IED node, despite it being
one. Although QGST data did not exclude the RMSF as an activity
node, the two grain types identiﬁed in the control sample i.e. types
1 and 2A (Table 6) from the RMSF, were also identiﬁed in control
samples taken from the three other locations, such that it is not
Table 4
Minerals and other materials recovered from spare components, both prior to movement of the raw materials to the IED build site, and following construction.
Device number/location Sample name Quartz (clear/citrine/milk) Prasiolite Mica Calcite A1: Aggregate of quartz,
calcite, tarmac and organic debris
A2: Aggregate containing quartz,
mica, charcoal and organic debris
Clasts (chalk, ﬂint, tarmac) Tarmac
Raw material storage facility Control sample U x U x x U x x
Car boot Control sample x x x x x x x x
Build site Control sample U x x U U x U U
IED cache Control sample U U x x x x x U
Emplacement Control sample U x x x x x x x
Spare components sampled
prior to transport to the build site
Wood (side panels) U x U x x U x x
Wood (top plate) U x U x x U x x
Plastic coated wire U x x x x U x x
Batteries U x U x x U x x
Battery pack U x U x x U x x
Spare components sampled following
construction at the build site
Wood (side panels) U x x U U x x U
Wood (top plate) U x x U U x x U
Plastic coated wire U x x x U x x U
Device number/location Sample name Charcoal Brick Organic material Plant material Multi-coloured ﬁbres Paint ﬂake Animal hair Insect shell Black ﬁbres Transparent
spheres
Raw material storage facility Control sample U U U U x U x U x x
Car boot Control sample x x x x x x x x U x
Build site Control sample x U U U x x U U x U
IED cache Control sample x x x x U x x x x U
Emplacement Control sample x U U U x x x U x x
Spare components sampled
prior to transport to the build site
Wood (side panels) U x U x x x x x x x
Wood (top plate) U U U U x x x U x x
Plastic coated wire U x U x x x x x x x
Batteries U x U x x x x x x x
Battery pack U U U U x x x U x x
Spare components sampled following
construction at the build site
Wood (side panels) x x U U x x x x x x
Wood (top plate) x x U U x x x x x x
Plastic coated wire x x U U x x x x x x
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Table 5
Description of the different quartz grain types identiﬁed in the four control samples, using SEM.
Grain
type
Characteristics Image
Type 1 Sub-angular to sub-rounded smooth grains, no mechanical abrasion on grain edge, old conchoidal fractures, surface of
grain shows some diagenetic etch marks
Type 2A Angular grains, no mechanical abrasion on grain edge, extensive diagenetic etching
Type 2B Angular grains, no mechanical abrasion on grain edge, clean face demonstrating no diagenetic etching
Type 3A Rounded to sub-rounded grains, no mechanical abrasion on grain edge, extensive diagenetic etching such that all other
surface features are lost
Type 3B Rounded to sub-rounded, no mechanical abrasion on grain edge, clean face demonstrating no diagenetic etching
Type 4 Elongate grains, no mechanical abrasion on grain edge, old conchoidal fractures, surface of grain shows some diagenetic
etch marks
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Table 6
The number of quartz grains types identiﬁed in each sample. For each sample n = 50.
Control samples Type 1 Type 2A Type 2B Type 3A Type 3B Type 4
Raw material storage facility 44 6 0 0 0 0
IED build location 19 22 5 3 1 0
IED cache 39 9 0 0 0 2
IED emplacement location 27 14 0 9 0 0
Table 7
Number of grains of each quartz grain type identiﬁed in samples recovered from mock device components. For each sample n = 50. N: no material recovered. It is important to
note, counts do not necessarily represent the proportion of different grain types within the sample as a whole.
Device Location Type 1 Type 2A Type 2B Type 3A Type 3B Type 4
1 Wood (side panels) 39 2 5 1 0 3
Wood (top plate) 43 3 0 0 0 4
Bare CU wire N N N N N N
Batteries 35 13 0 2 0 0
Tape 31 14 5 0 0 0
Battery pack 20 23 4 2 0 1
Inside container 26 20 2 1 1 0
Outside container 39 6 0 2 0 3
2 Wood (side panels) 26 17 4 0 0 3
Wood (top plate) 28 13 5 0 0 4
Bare CU wire 15 27 4 1 0 3
Batteries 16 24 5 0 0 5
Tape 21 19 6 4 0 0
Battery pack 22 15 6 2 0 5
Inside container 24 22 3 1 0 0
Outside container 15 29 4 2 0 0
3 Wood (side panels) 25 18 1 0 0 6
Wood (top plate) 36 12 0 2 0 0
Bare CU wire 19 27 0 4 0 0
Batteries 22 21 5 1 0 1
Tape 14 29 4 2 1 0
Battery pack 29 17 1 2 0 1
Inside container 22 23 4 1 0 0
Outside container 12 29 7 2 0 0
60 B. Wilks et al. / Forensic Science International 278 (2017) 52–67possible to determine whether the occurrence of types 1 and 2A,
reﬂects the RMSF, and/or the other 3 locations.
By analysing spare IED components from the RMSF, which were
sampled prior to transportation to the IED build site, it was possible
to identify that charcoal and A2 were transferred from the RMSF
onto spare components (Table 4). However, following the
construction of devices at the build site, analysis of spare
components (which underwent the device construction process)
revealed that such material derived from the RMSF was not
preserved. This would suggest that the loss of such material may be
a function of movement of the raw materials either to the IED build
site or during device construction. Preferential decay of speciﬁc
materials could inﬂuence the inferences made from the analysis
results, and lead to the possible false exclusion of supply chain
activity nodes.
Paint ﬂakes were only identiﬁed in the control sample taken
from the RMSF, and in very small quantities i.e. 2 ﬂakes (Table 3).
No paint ﬂakes were identiﬁed on spare device components which
were sampled prior to transport of the raw materials to the IED
build site (Table 4), this highlights the issue of a rare component
being found at the source, but it not being transferred onto objects
and/or people which have been at that location.
A1, individual grains of calcite, animal hair and clasts of ﬂint,
chalk and tarmac were identiﬁed exclusively in the control
samples taken from the IED build site, and thus their occurrence
on device components was used as an indicator of this activity
node (Table 3). The aggregates were observed on all components of
the three devices, whilst the stones/clasts were only identiﬁed inthe inside of the container of all three devices. Animal hair was
noted on the bare copper wire of device 3, the electrical tape of
device 1, and the inside of the container of all three devices. The
identiﬁcation of A1, individual grains of calcite, animal hair and
clasts of ﬂint, chalk and tarmac, is indicative of material from the
IED build site having been transferred and preserved on all three
mock devices. Moreover, type 2B grains, which were identiﬁed
only in the build site control sample, were identiﬁed on at least
4 components of all three devices.
Prasiolite, multicoloured ﬁbres and type 4 grains were
identiﬁed only in the IED cache control sample, and were therefore
used as indicators of this activity node (Table 3). Unlike prasiolite
where only 2 grains were identiﬁed, the multicoloured ﬁbres were
extremely common in the control sample. Samples recovered from
the inside of the container of all three devices were the only
samples not to comprise multicoloured ﬁbres indicative of the IED
cache. The absence of multicoloured ﬁbres suggests that the IED
cache was not the geographical source of material recovered from
the inside of the three containers. The occurrence of the
multicoloured ﬁbres (on all other components) and type 4 grains
(on at least 3 other components) is indicative of material from the
IED cache being transferred and preserved on mock devices.
As discussed it was possible to exclude the cache and RMSF
from having contributed to the material recovered from the inside
of the 3 containers. Moreover, because the inside of the container
was only opened at the build site to add the enhancement and
mock explosive, and then resealed, it is probable that the
recoverable material preserved was sourced only from the build
Fig. 3. Particle size distribution histograms of control samples.
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inside of the container may preserve a mineralogical and QGST
signal representative of a single node i.e. the IED build site,
reducing the complexity of mixed provenance sample interpreta-
tion. However, this observation is clearly case speciﬁc and would
depend upon the manner in which the device was constructed;
further contextual research would be required to establish
whether this is a more generalizable trend.
Unlike control samples taken from the RMSF, IED build site,
and IED cache, the emplacement location control sample did not
comprise constituents or grain types that distinguished this
location from the other activity nodes. It was only the absence of
certain constituents, including animal hair, multicoloured ﬁbres,
transparent spheres, A1, and A2, and grain types i.e. 2B, 3B and 4
(Table 3 and 7) that could distinguish the emplacement location
from the other locations. This adds complexity during interpre-
tation, as it is not possible to determine whether the occurrence
of constituents consistent with the emplacement location, were
from the emplacement site or another node. Nevertheless, in
adopting the exclusion principle, interpretation of the mineralogy
and QGSTs of the environmental material recovered from all
components of the three mock devices, was such that the
emplacement location could not be excluded as having contrib-
uted material to all components of three devices, with the
exception of the bare Cu wire of device 1, where no material was
recovered.
Fibres from the inside of the car (black) were distinguished from
IED cache ﬁbres (multicoloured) based on their colour (Table 3). No
ﬁbres pertaining to the inside of the car were identiﬁed in any of
the material recovered from components of the three devices using
binocular microscopy.The preservation of material derived from multiple prove-
nances on a single device highlighted the importance of selecting
appropriate analytical techniques that do not produce a bulk
environmental signature, as this inhibits the ability to distinguish
individual provenances within a mixed source sample. In this case
for example, comparison of the grain size distribution of a sample
taken from the outside of the container of mock device 3 with the
four control samples would have resulted in the exclusion of all
four control samples as potential nodes of the IED supply chain
(Figs. 3 and 4). Given that PSA produces a bulk signature, PSA was
used solely as a descriptive technique in this pilot study. PSA
results indicate that the samples are mixed provenance and/or that
preferential transfer and decay of particular grain sizes onto mock
device components has occurred.
It is important to recognise that all adhering environmental
materials may not be recoverable, particularly for certain types of
analysis, as was the case for material adhering to the electrical
tape, which could be analysed using an SEM and a binocular
microscope, but not a laser granulometer. Failure to analyse these
materials could affect the inferences that it is possible to make, and
must be acknowledged during interpretation and presentation of
results.
By adopting a comparative approach, it was possible to
illustrate that environmental materials were transferred and
preserved from multiple activity nodes of the simulated supply
chain, on mock device components (Fig. 4). Identifying that such
transfers occur and persist indicates that there is signiﬁcant
potential for the use of geoforensic analysis as a method to
reconstruct the geographical journey of an IED through a supply
chain. However, this would rely on the use of analytical
techniques and an interpretative approach which are capable
Fig. 4. Particle size distribution histograms of material recovered from different components of the mock three devices.
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4.2. Secondary transfer
Binocular microscopy revealed the presence of tarmac particles
and transparent spheres in control samples taken from both the
IED build site and cache (Table 3). The transparent spheres
identiﬁed are commonly found in road paint [43]. Such a ﬁnding in
a seek and ﬁnd investigation, in which no comparator samples are
available, would suggest one or more nodes of the supply chain to
be located on, along, or close by a road side e.g. grass bank, however
this was not the case. One possible explanation for such results, is
that both the equine pastureland and riding arena have vehicles
driving through them, and are also used for overﬂow parking. Cars
entering the two sites may deposit tarmac and transparent spheres
from their wheels, previously transferred onto the wheels from
roads. Such results demand appreciation of the potential for
secondary transfer between different sites, so to limit false positive
and negative exclusions of a geographical location during seek and
ﬁnd investigations. Alternatively, the transparent spheres recov-
ered may be directly deposited ﬂy ash particles [44]. Further
investigation by chemical analysis may help to ascertain the source
of the transparent spheres if there speciﬁc provenance was
pertinent to the forensic reconstruction.
4.3. Temporal spatial variation in particle size at a single location in
the supply chain
As discussed in Section 4.1, through exclusion and using
contextual information, it is likely that the RMSF, IED cache andemplacement location can be excluded as having contributed
material to the inside of the 3 containers. However the particle size
distribution of material recovered from the inside of all three
containers does not correspond with the distribution of the control
sample taken from the IED build site (Figs. 3 and 4). One potential
explanation for this is the presence of small scale spatial variation
in particle size distribution at the build site. The material added to
the inside of the container to enhance fragmentation, was taken
from a location within the ﬁeld where there were clusters of
pebbles. However the control sample for the build site was taken
25 m away, where the mock devices were actually constructed.
Alternatively, this variation could be a product of heterogeneity
within the sample bags containing the recovered materials and
control samples, such that the distribution curves produced are not
representative of the whole sample. It is important to remember
that comparison using PSA is based on the assumption that a
recovered sample will possess material that has both the same
grain sizes of the control sample, and also the same distribution.
This is unlike the mineralogical and QGSTA approach taken within
this study.
Despite consistency in the mineralogy and QGSTs of material
recovered from the inside of the containers in all three devices
(with the exception of a type 3B grain recovered from device 1), the
particle size distribution varied between mock device 1, and mock
devices 2 and 3 (Fig. 3). It is possible, given that mock device 1 was
built on a different day (dry weather conditions) to devices 2 and 3
(built following wet and strong wind weather conditions), that the
observed differences could be attributed to the saturated ground
becoming re-worked by equine activity. Alternatively, small-scale
particle size variability within the ﬁeld, and/or sample bag
heterogeneity may explain the different particle size distributions.
Fig. 4. (Continued)
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the need for caution when using particle size analysis in a forensic
enquiry, as other studies have demonstrated [45,46]. Such ﬁndingscombined with the inability of PSA to distinguish individual
provenances in a mixed sample, substantiates the case for PSA to
be used as a descriptive tool as opposed to an exclusionary
Fig. 4. (Continued)
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Table 8
Environments excluded given the absence of common quartz grain surface features [34].
Absent texture Environmental exclusion
Blocky breakage Glacial
Glacial grinding and crush marks Glacial
Grain to grain impact collision features Turbulent rivers, wave zone of beach, desert
Filaments Wooded environment with humic soils
Grain edge abrasion Subaqueous environment
V-shaped pits/indentors Subaqueous environment
Hertzian/star shaped fractures Subaqueous environment
Platy textures Mature aeolian sand seas
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results should be treated tentatively and in context with the results
from other independent forms of analysis.
4.4. Seek and ﬁnd investigation
Although the main aim of the study was to establish whether
environmental materials were transferred and preserved on mock
device components from multiple activity nodes of the simulated
IED supply chain, consideration was also given to use of the results
in a seek and ﬁnd style investigation. In combining results from
both QGSTA and mineralogy, it was possible to exclude a number of
environments from having been used in the simulated supply
chain. The application of results derived from particle size analysis
to the identiﬁcation of potential geographical provenances was not
considered due to the comparative nature of the technique.
The presence of quartz in all samples recovered from device
components provided limited information as to the type of
environment from which material was derived, owing to its
ubiquitous nature. However, QGSTA provided intelligence funda-
mental for environmental provenance reconstruction. The majori-
ty of the quartz grains recovered from different components of the
three devices displayed varying degrees of diagenetic alteration,
whilst a small number demonstrated complete grain breakage.
During pedogenesis, both acids and bases within ﬂuids percolating
through soils have the potential to modify the surface of quartzTable 9
Provenance information derived from the identiﬁcation of different materials in samples r
carried out to provide information as to the geographical location of activities in the s
Material
recovered
Provenance indication Potentia
Paint Analysis
be comp
endeavo
Clasts of
chalk
Geographical location with a bedrock geology of chalk and/or
a ﬂuvial/alluvial environment depositing chalk clasts
87Sr/86Sr
will pro
Tarmac Location with tarmac surfaces e.g. road, pavement, car park,
driveway
Charcoal Location where there has been a ﬁre or burning of some sort
Brick Locations with brick structures
Fibres Microsc
chemica
to ident
Animal hair Oxygen 
from wh
Transparent
spheres
If reﬂectance spheres, would indicate location with road
paint/road signs e.g. roads, car parks
Element
paint
Plant
material
Hand/m
identiﬁe
not deri
Organic
material
Gas chro
indicatio
derived 
Insect shells Identiﬁcgrains by either solution or deposition of precipitates [34]. The
orientated etch marks on the surface of the grains recovered from
different components of the three mock devices are a likely
function of solution, thus their presence is suggestive of a
geographical provenance i.e. IED supply chain activity node/s with
soil formation. Although the limited features present did little to
indicate a speciﬁc type of environment from which the samples
were derived, the absence of surface textures facilitated the
exclusion of a number of different types of environments and
bedrock geologies as potential sources of the recovered material.
Table 8 details the environments that can be excluded given the
absence of a number of common surface features.
Geographically speciﬁc provenance indicators can be used in
combination with QGSTA to assess whether it is possible to further
reconstruct the environment from which samples were derived.
Table 9 details geographical location information derived from the
identiﬁcation of different types of material in samples recovered
from mock device components, as well as further analysis which
could be carried out to provide additional information as to the
geographical location of activities in the supply chain. Such
information could be combined with other data to produce a
multi-source intelligence product.
Although the material recovered from device components can
be used to indicate potential environments involved in the supply
chain, it is vital to consider that secondary transfer [47] and
transportation of material from source site to another locationecovered from mock device components, as well as additional analysis that could be
upply chain but that was beyond the scope of this study.
l for additional analysis
 of the paint to identify if it is automobile paint, if so its chemical composition can
ared against automobile paint databases to exclude, make, model and year, in an
ur to identify the car to which the paint is derived
 isotope analysis of the chalk clasts – comparison against 87Sr/86Sr sea level curve
vide a crude estimate of potential sources of the clasts through exclusion
opic analysis of the ﬁbre to identify type (naturally occurring, synthetic etc), and
l analysis of the ﬁbre to establish composition of the dye, both of which may help
ify a source
isotope analysis of the hair to identify through exclusion, potential water sources
ich the animal was drinking
al analysis to establish whether ﬂy ash particles or reﬂectance spheres from road
icroscopic identiﬁcation of the plant/seed/ﬂower/pollen type ! Comparison of
d material against vegetation maps, to exclude areas from which the material is
ved
matography analysis of the organics to obtain alkane proﬁle, which may offer an
n of the type of vegetation and land use from which the organic material is
[44]
ation of the insect, and the locations/habitats in which they occur
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previous or historic environment, for example alkane proﬁles of
organics recovered may represent the vegetation which previ-
ously grew in the area, from which they are derived, owing to
them residing in soil for substantial periods of time [48]. All
forensic techniques possess limitations, and consideration and
presentation of them is essential during interpretation and
communication to decision makers, whether for CJS or intelli-
gence purposes.
The effectiveness of seek and ﬁnd operations is understandably
dependent upon the type of material recovered from devices, the
availability of relevant comparative databases, both of which are
likely to be case speciﬁc, as well as the availability of techniques
which are capable of distinguishing different geographical sources
within a single sample. However, in carrying out such pilot study, it
is possible to provide an initial evidence base for the use of
geoforensic analysis, to derive intelligence as to the geographical
location of IED supply chain activities.
5. Conclusions
This study is the ﬁrst to address the application of geoforensic
analysis to the exploitation of IEDs for C-IED efforts. A number of
signiﬁcant ﬁndings have been presented:
1. Materials derived from multiple nodes of the simulated IED
supply chain were transferred and preserved on device
components. This could potentially facilitate identiﬁcation of
the geographical location of IED supply chain activities, which in
turn may support an attack on the IED network.
2. Sampling from different locations on recovered devices is
crucial to establish whether different components preserve
signals related to different nodes of the supply chain, and/or
signals derived from a single node.
3. Transfer of material between different provenances i.e. second-
ary transfer has the potential to produce misleading intelli-
gence.
4. Mixed provenance signals preserved on devices favour analyti-
cal approaches which can detect multiple sources within a
sample to prevent false positive or negative exclusions during
interpretation.
5. PSA should typically only be used as a descriptive tool in a
forensic inquiry due to both the inability to distinguish
individual provenance signals in a mixture, and the potential
occurrence of small scale spatial variability, and short term
temporal changes in particle size distribution. Such factors may
lead to false positive of negative exclusions.
6. The improvised nature of IEDs introduces signiﬁcant complexity
and variability factors when seeking to establish an evidence
base for the interpretation of information derived from such
devices.
This preliminary study has demonstrated the expansion of the
application of geoforensic analysis to address the pressing
international security challenge that IEDs pose. It has been
established that there exists the potential to exploit geoforensic
analysis for intelligence that may help to identify links between
places, people, devices and vehicles in the IED supply chain. This
could ultimately assist C-IED efforts, in attacking the networks
that facilitate the distribution of large numbers of IEDs.
Application of geoforensic analysis to actual IED exploitation
cases is necessary to test the efﬁcacy of this innovative approach
in casework scenarios.Acknowledgements
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